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ABSTRACT 
Most port areas can produce impacts and pressures on the historical and architectural 
heritage, leading to potential rapid pathological effects and generating high risks in 
terms of damages and losses of historical, artistic and cultural values. These negative 
impacts are caused mainly by the industrial and productive activities which often 
involve the transportation and handling of hazardous cargoes and materials. 
In addition to the stationary actions (air pollution, waste, water discharges), port 
activities could generate exceptional impacts: the so-called “major accidents”, such 
as fires, explosions and chemical releases, which occur from time to time in 
industrial plants. These potential accidents can have a severe impact, depending on 
the interference and the distance between the historic areas urban areas and the 
industrial facilities of modern ports. 
The present contribution analyses and discusses a given case, the port of Brindisi, 
suggesting a methodology for the assessment of exceptional impacts in ports, in 
order to identify those potential accidents and their effects on the historical 
landscape. Particularly, the probability and frequency of occurrence is estimated, 
including the consequences on heritage, in terms of potential damages and losses. 
The performed assessment points out that, as often occurs in ports, the most frequent 
major accidents are caused by ship-ship impacts and ship-land ones involving a 
hazardous material. In fact, in these cases a loss of containment could be generated, 
with the potential occurrence of fires and explosions in sensible areas of the port 
context. Another risk source identified in the port is the presence of silos for grain 
storage in the more urban basin of Brindisi, which represents a potential hazard for 
the surrounding historic heritage, because of the possibility of the occurrence of a 
powder explosion. 
The methodology proposed for this given case aims to demonstrate that in the 
historical port areas, such as in the Mediterranean Sea, the development and 
management should be accompanied, or even oriented to the protection of the 
historical and cultural landscape, which represents an intangible value for the city 
and, generally speaking, for all mankind. 
1 Introduction 
When analyzing the potential environmental damage on historical heritage, usually 
only the impact associated to the “stationary” action (Trozzi and Vaccaro, 2000) 
(Darbra et al., 2004a) (Puig et al., 2015) is taken into consideration. Stationary action 
refers here to certain conditions that exist practically always or, at least, with certain 
frequency. Into this category, atmospheric pollution is the main factor, with its 
aggression to construction materials (UN ECE 2012) (European Commission 2010). 
Other contributions, as for example water contamination, sandy winds, etc., can have 
also a significant role in some cases. 
However, another potential impact can exist, associated to exceptional situations: 
that caused by the so-called “major accidents”. Major accident is the term applied to 
accidents with important potential effects and consequences on people, equipment 
and environment. They are usually associated to industrial plants –chemical, energy– 
and are essentially explosions, fires and toxic materials releases. Their effects could 
be blast, thermal radiation and toxic/aggressive doses. 
Concerning the potential damage to buildings and historical heritage, toxic or 
chemically aggressive accidental releases should not be considered to be significant, 
as a general rule. They can originate a cloud that will move with the wind, and due 
to their short duration, they will not represent a real threat in most cases. Therefore, 
explosions and fires are the most significant potential accidental impacts.  
In this paper, their possible influence is analyzed for a given case, the port of Brindisi 
in South Italy, characterized by a high level of interference between landscaping 
elements and dangerous port activities. Particularly, the contribution will identify 
and discuss the main potential accidents in the port with their possible consequences 
on the historical heritage within it. 
2 Major accidents scenarios 
During the last decades, most port areas have undergone the transformation and 
integration of spaces and functions, resulting in modern industrial, commercial and 
touristic poles. Particularly, many of them are associated to the loading and 
unloading, as well as storage, of hazardous materials, such as oil, chemical products, 
natural gas and others, which could represent a certain risk for people and 
environment, including historical and cultural heritage.  
Major accidents, defined as “an occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or 
explosion” (Directive Council EC 1997), involve the release of significant amounts 
of energy or hazardous materials, instantaneously or in a relatively short period. 
They could occur in establishments or during the transportation with ships, trains or 
trucks or during loading/unloading operations.  
Figure 1 shows the main potential scenarios of the major accidents (Casal, 2008). 
Several events may follow the release of the hazardous substance. Depending on its 
properties, conditions and physical state, among the others. If a not flammable liquid 
is released, environmental pollution or toxic dispersion are the main potential 
accidents. If the liquid/vapor is flammable, instead, a flammable gas cloud could be 
produced, which, if ignited, could generated an explosion, with disruptive effect on 
the surroundings.  
The release of a gas or a vapor can lead to other effects. If the release occurs at a 
high speed, atmospheric dispersion is the main outcome, although if the substance is 
flammable, a jet-fire also occur. If the release takes place at low speed, an explosion 
is possible (if it is flammable), as well as a subsonic jet-fire. 
Fine dust and powder may also generate dangerous clouds, which if ignited can lead 
to severe explosion. These incidents are caused by the ignition of fine particles in 
confined spaces, such as, for example, a silo or a pneumatic conveying system. 
Finally, another cause of incidents, common in industrial plants, is related to the 
explosion of superheated liquids or pressurized gas in tanks, which can produce 
overpressures and fragments. 
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of accidents that can occur following the loss of containment, their 
effects and potential damage on architectures (Source: adapted from Casal, 2008) 
  
3 The Port of Brindisi 
3.1 Morphology 
The port of Brindisi is located on the Adriatic Sea coasts of Apulia, in the South-
East of Italy.  Its natural configuration and strategic position make its basin as the 
safest in the South Adriatic Sea, since ancient times. 
Nowadays, the port, which has about 5 million square meters, is characterized by 
three basins (Brindisi Port Authority Informer 2010): the outer, the middle and the 
inner port (Fig. 2). Within them, several functions and activities take place. 
The outer port has a basin surface of 3 million s. m. It is delimited by the mainland 
on the south side, Pedagne islands on the East, the island of S. Andrew and Costa 
Morena docks on the West, and by the dam of “Punta Riso” on the North side. In 
this basin mainly industrial activities take place, partly related to the energetic and 
petrochemical port, including the facilities for the loading/unloading of raw 
materials. Military facilities are also located in the island of Capo Bianco. 
The middle port has a 1.2 million s. m. surface and it is bordered by the Costa Morena 
docks on the South, the island of St. Andrea on the East, the dam of “Bocche di 
Puglia” on the North and the Pigonati Channel on West side. It houses different 
functions: a touristic and yacht port, a cruise and passenger port and several docks 
for handling cargoes of various types. In fact, bulk carriers (coal) and container ships 
berth on the West docks of Costa Morena, while LPG carriers dock on the East. 
The inner port is located in the historical harbor of the city, active since the Roman 
Empire. Its two bays, of East and of West, have represented the center of the 
maritime traffic of the city for centuries. They have about 727,000 s. m. of surface, 
divided in two similar basins. The East Bay houses essentially passenger ships on 
one side; on the other docks, solid and liquid bulk (foods and feeds) and bunkering 
activities are carried out. 
The West bay is the more urban area of the port. It is characterized by historical 
waterfront with a monumental promenade, including yacht docks. Other activities, 
such as fishing, are also present. The terminal part of the bay houses the military 
arsenal. Both bays embrace the historical city on the north and east sides. 
Fig. 2 Morphology of the port of Brindisi (Adapted from: Martino et al., 2015b) 
 
3.2 Historical built heritage of the port 
Fig. 3 The Montecatini shed and the grain silos on the left, the maritime station on the right  
 
Fig. 4 The Alfonsjno Castle with the port facilities on the background 
   
The assessment of the historical heritage has provided its classification and 
qualification in terms of typology, state of conservation and characteristics. 
Particularly, the heritage has been assigned to specific categories, identified through 
an historical and morphological assessment of Mediterranean ports (Martino, 
Fatiguso and De Tommasi, 2015a). The qualification of heritage condition (poor, 
fair, good and very good) has been carried out through direct surveys on sites, while 
the historical information has been obtained from the Brindisi State Archive and 
bibliographic research (Martino, De Fino and De Tommasi, 2015b). 
Table 1 Assessment of heritage categories in the port of Brindisi  
Classification of historical and 
architectural heritage of ports 
Architectural heritage in the port of Brindisi 
Historical buildings (B): 
B1. Productive and industrial 
archaeology: Arsenals, warehouses, 
sheds and stores. 
 
B2. Logistic buildings: Customhouses, 
captaineries, port offices, lighthouses 
and maritime stations. 
 
B3. Commercial and mercantile 
buildings: Fondaci, caravanserai and 
similar facilities, palaces for trade and 
merchants, lodges or markets. 
 
B4. Fortifications and similar 
buildings: Castles, fortresses, bastions, 
towers and walls. 
 
B5. Sacred architectures: Cathedrals, 
churches, monasteries and convents. 
Historical spaces and areas (S) 
S1. Historical spaces of ports: docks, 
piers, quays, wharves, basins and 
promenade. 
 
S2. Archaeological sites: submerged 
and on-land remains. 
 
S3. Maritime districts: historical 
centers, waterfront, curtains, districts. 
 
Heritage: 
Montecatini shed 
 
Maritime Academy 
 
Maritime Station 
 
Traversa Lighthouse 
 
Punta Riso 
Lighthouse 
 
Alfonsino Castle 
 
Swabia Castle 
 
Punta delle Terrare 
 
Historical waterfront 
 
Sailor’s Monument 
 
Fisherman’s village 
 
S. Andrew Island 
Category: 
B1 
 
B2 
 
B2 
 
B2 
 
B2 
 
 
B4 
 
B4 
 
S2 
 
S3 
 
S3 
 
S3 
 
S3 
Origin data: 
1930 
 
1937 
 
1940 
 
1861 
 
1890 
 
 
1481 
 
1233 
 
Prehistoric 
 
XII-XIX cent. 
 
1933 
 
1960 
 
XV-XX cent. 
State: 
Fair 
 
Poor 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Poor 
 
 
Poor 
 
Fair 
 
Poor 
 
Good 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
 
Poor 
 
 
The port and the city of Brindisi have one of the most important historic heritages in 
Apulia and, in general, in Italy. In fact, since ancient time, Greeks, Romans and other 
civilizations settled in Brindisi, due to its strategic position with respect to the 
Oriental traffics. As a consequence, nowadays, the city has accumulated several 
historical buildings and remains, mostly located around the port waters. 
Among the historical heritage of the port of Brindisi (Table 1) it should be 
mentioned, firstly, in the category B1, the wooden shed of Montecatini (Fig. 3), built 
in the early XXth century. Other buildings in the port context are the lighthouses 
(Island of Pedagne, Island of St. Andrea), the Maritime Station (Fig. 3) and the Naval 
College, which belong to B2 category. All these buildings, except the lighthouses, 
were built by the Fascist Regime in the period 1930-1940.  
Furthermore, some of the most important architectures in Brindisi are the 
fortifications (B4), which protected the city and the port over the centuries. In the 
inner port, West Bay, the Swabia Castle is located in the Arsenal and military areas. 
Between the outer and the middle port, another fortress was built in the XVth 
century: the Alfonso Castle (Fig. 4) with the hornwork. Among the historical areas, 
there is an archaeological site (S2) near the Costa Morena West docks, called “Punta 
delle Terrare”. The other heritage concerns the historical waterfront, the fishing 
district and the island of St. Andrea (S3).  
As can be seen in Table 1, some of these heritage elements are not well-preserved 
today. Moreover, some of them are located near the port facilities and infrastructures 
and, therefore, in some of cases, in dangerous areas. 
4 Potential major accidents and consequences on historical heritage 
The port of Brindisi is characterized by five main functions: mercantile/commercial, 
cruise/passenger, military, fishing and touristic. These activities are located in 
different parts of the port as already explained and, because of their nature, involve 
hazardous materials and operation, resulting in risk factors for people, environment 
and buildings. Particularly, the assessment of the port and its activities points out 
that the main dangers for historical environment and heritage are represented by the 
energetic pole at Costa Morena, in the middle basin, and with the presence of the 
silos for solid fine bulk in the inner port. In the first case, Costa Morena houses an 
LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) handling dock, in which liquefied gas is unloaded 
from gas-carriers to the station through a pipeline. The carriers have an average 
capacity of gas of 6,000 tons. The presence of the silos for grain storage is another 
risk source for the surroundings, especially because they are located in the East Bay 
of the Inner Port and, thus, close to the urban zone and some historical sites. 
The potential major accidents that both the energetic pole and the silos can imply are 
the loss of containment of a flammable material followed by a fire or an explosion, 
and a dust explosion in the silos. The most dangerous accident for heritage, among 
them, is represented by the explosions. Once the potential origin of accidents 
analyzed, two main scenarios have been identified, in order to estimate their 
frequencies and potential consequences on the port environment: 
 Ship-ship collision in the port-water: LPG release and explosion. 
 Accident in the grain silos: powder explosion. 
4.1 Explosion in LPG ship due to collision with another ship or with docks 
Estimation of frequencies: 
According to a historical survey of major accidents occurred in ports (Darbra and 
Casal, 2004b) (Darbra et al., 2004c), the most common ones involved the transport 
operations and, particularly, ships impacts. In fact, 56% of 471 accidents analyzed 
from the Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) were associated to 
transport. In this category, ship collision (with other ships and land) was the most 
frequent origin of the accident, with 65% of cases. Especially in the impact accidents, 
ship-ship collision was the main cause, with 45% of cases, followed by the ship-land 
impact with 26%. In order to estimate the hazardousness of these phenomena, their 
frequency and probability have to be assessed. Previous studies have shown some 
frequencies of the most common accidents in ports (Ronza et al., 2003): the ship-
ship collision producing a release and, then, a major accident, has an estimated 
frequency of 1.0 x 10-5 (harbor movement)-1 or 4.8 x 10-4 ship-1 x year-1; the average 
frequency of the impact between ship and jetties, instead, is 8.16 x 10-6 (harbor 
movement)-1. 
Table 2 Scenarios for loss of containment due to impact of ships in ports (Source: Bevi Manual, 2009) 
Scenarios Frequency 
Gas tankers: 
1. Continuous release of 180 m3 in 1,800 s 
2. Continuous release of 90 m3 in 1,800 s 
 
0.00012 x f0 
0.025 x f0 
Semi-Gas tankers (refrigerated) 
1. Continuous release of 126 m3 in 1,800 s 
2. Continuous release of 32 m3 in 1,800 s 
 
0.00012 x f0 
0.025 x f0 
A methodology for the estimation of the frequency of loss of containment from ships 
is provided by the Purple Book and the Reference Manual Bevi Risk Assessment. 
The scenarios of ships failure could regard gas tankers and semi-gas tankers, as 
shown in Table 2. Particularly, the frequency of gas releases depends on the expected 
frequency (f0) of the initial event, on the frequency of ships operation in the port and 
on the loading time. For the port of Brindisi, the frequency has been estimated as: 
f0 = 6.7 x 10
-11 x T x t x N = 6.7 x 10-11 x 4,500 x 15 x 160 = 7.2 x 10-4 visit-1 
F= 0.00012 x f0 = 8.64 x 10
-8 visit-1 = 1.3 x 10
-5
 year
-1 
where: 
T = 4,500 ships, the total number of ships per annum in the port (Assoporti 2014) 
t = 6,000 tons/400 tons h-1 = 15 h, the average time of loading operation per ship (Port Authority of 
Brindisi 2014) 
N = 160 is the number of loading operations per year (IPEM spa 2015) 
The frequency of an explosion occurring in a ship impact in port could be estimated 
with an event-tree analysis. The event-tree analysis is a methodology that can 
provide the probabilities of the sequences of events following the initial accident. 
Starting from the initial frequency of the incident (loss of containment), the diverse 
possibilities are considered and their frequencies are estimated by applying the 
probabilities of the diverse intermediate events (immediate ignition or not, delayed 
ignition or not, etc.); these probabilities are known from expert knowledge and can 
be found from the adequate sources (De Haag and Ale., 1999) (RIVM, 2009). 
Fig. 5 General event tree for LPG spill (Source: Ronza et al., 2007) 
 
Particularly, according to previous studies (Ronza, Vilchez and Casal, 2007) the 
release could have an upwards or downwards direction, with assigned equal 
probabilities of 50%. In relation to this kind of occurrence, different events could 
follow, depending on the potential immediate ignition probability. If the release is 
directed downwards, the probability of immediate ignition is low (0.065), however 
it is likely to occur a delayed ignition, which could lead to an unconfined vapor cloud 
explosion if flame front acceleration occurs. The event-tree in Fig. 5 points out that 
Initial Event 
Upwards 
Release 
Immediate 
Ignition 
Delayed 
Ignition 
Flame for 
acceleration Outcome 
Yes 
P1=0.5 
 
No 
P1=0.5 
 
Yes 
P2=0.5 
 
No 
P2=0.5 
 
No 
P4=0.935 
 
Yes 
P4=0.065 
 
No 
P3=0.5 
 
Yes 
P3=0.5 
 
Jet Fire 
Jet Fire 
Cloud 
Dispersion 
No 
P5=0.5 
 
Yes 
P5=0.5 
 
Yes 
P6=0.40 
 
No 
P6=0.60 
 
Cloud 
Dispersion 
Flash Fire 
Vapor Cloud 
Explosion 
Pool Fire 
Loss of 
Containment 
the outcomes corresponding to the diverse possible accidental sequences are jet fire, 
cloud dispersion, vapor cloud explosion, flash fire and pool fire. Among these 
possible accidents, the one which could damage the historical target is the vapor 
cloud explosion, its effects being blast (overpressure wave) and fragments ejection.  
An unconfined vapor cloud explosion following the external impact of ships in the 
port waters could be produced if a downwards release is ignited with a certain delay. 
In this case, a flammable cloud can be originated; depending on its size, flame front 
acceleration can occur, with the occurrence of an overpressure wave. The 
corresponding probability and frequency are the followings ones: 
P (UVCE) = P1 x P4 x P5 x P6 = 0.5 x 0.935 x 0.5 x 0.40 = 0.094 
F(UVCE) = 0.094 x 1.3 x 10
-5 year-1 = 1.22 x 10
-8
 year
-1
 
 
Estimation of effects: 
The estimation of the effects of the blast wave on the surroundings can be carried 
out for an unconfined explosion using the TNT model, which associates an amount 
of flammable substance to those of the equivalent amount of TNT (Casal, 2008). 
Considering a ship-ship collision in port-water as the initial accidental event, a 
failure of the LPG tank could occur, causing a spill of propane. This initial event 
could lead to different events with different probabilities and effects. One of them 
could be the unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE), when a gas release is 
dispersed in the atmosphere and the flammable cloud thus originated is later on 
ignited.  
In the case of Brindisi, the LPG carriers have an average capacity of 6,000 tons (with 
a maximum value of 20,000 tons) and are characterized by 2, 3 or 4 tanks per ship, 
depending on the ship size. Table 3 gives some data concerning the LPG 
transportation by ship. 
 
Table 3 Generic data of the ship and substance transported 
Data 
Ship typology and tanks capacity 
LPG carrier (6,000 tons average capacity) with 
3 tanks with average of 2,000 tons 
Hazardous substance 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas - Propane 
ΔHC = 40400 kJ kg-1 
ρLiq20 = 500 kg m-3 
ρLiq55 = 444 kg m-3 
ρvap55 =37 kg m-3 
 
 
The collision of a ship with docks, jetties or another ship can lead to a spill of 
hazardous substance, in this case LPG. If a rupture originates a release, a flammable 
gas cloud can be generated. The mass of the fuel in the cloud has to be evaluated in 
order to estimate the possible effects and consequences on the surroundings. In this 
case, a release of 180 m3 during 1800 s has been considered (Table 2).  
The equivalent mass of TNT, a well-known conventional explosive, can be 
calculated. To do this, the efficiency of the explosion (very low for unconfined 
hydrocarbon clouds, approximately 3%), the heat of combustion (lower value) of 
LPG and the energy released by TNT are required (Casal, 2008): 
WTNT (kg) = µ M (ΔHC/ΔHTNT) = 23,300 kg 
where 
M = 90,000 kg  
ΔHC = 40,400 kJ kg-1 
µ = 0.03 
ΔHTNT = 4680 kJ kg-1 
(a release of 180 m3, with ρLiq20 = 500 kg m-3). 
Once the equivalent mass of TNT evaluated, the so-called scaled distance has to be 
calculated:  
dsc (m) = R/ (WTNT)
1/3 = R * 0.035 
where 
R is the distance to the target, m. 
Using the following function, the scaled distance can be associated to of the 
maximum value of overpressure at a specific distance: 
ΔP (bar) = 1/dsc + 1/(dsc)
2 + 1/(dsc)
3 
The results obtained for the overpressure at different distances can be seen in Table 
4 and Figure 6.  
Table 4 Relationship between the distance, the scaled distance and the overpressure 
Distance R (m) Scaled distance dsc (m kg
-1/3) ΔP Overpressure (bar) 
100 3.5 0.380 
200 7.0 0.160 
300 10.5 0.100 
400 14.0 0.070 
800 28.0 0.037 
Fig. 6 Relationship between the real distance and overpressure in the UVCE 
 
The calculation of the peak overpressure leads to the identification of the potential 
damage of the blast on buildings and equipment, in this case with cultural and 
historical values. Data obtained from real cases have been gathered as criteria for 
predicting the effects of the overpressure. Particularly, for pick overpressure less 
than 0.03 bar, the damages on buildings are not serious, regarding only the breakage 
of windows in most of cases. Peaks of overpressure from 0.05 to 0.18 bar, instead, 
can produce several damages on structures, although not the complete destruction of 
them. If ΔP has a value from 0.15 to 0.18 bar structural damages could occur, 
especially producing cracks in masonries and brickworks of buildings. Sometimes 
walls and roofs could also collapse under these values of overpressure. From 0.18 
bar overpressures, serious structural damages are likely to occur on buildings and 
equipment: at 0.35 bar most of buildings are destroyed, while from 0.50 to 0.70 bar 
the destruction of the most resistant structures is possible (Casal, 2008).   
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5.2 Powder explosion in silos 
In the inner port of Brindisi, especially in the East Bay, a plant for processing and 
storage of bulk fine solids is located. It consists of a silo with a capacity of 50,000 
tons, which is close to the docks of the port, where bulk carriers unload products. 
Once the last trends of the port analyzed, in terms of cereals, food and feed, the 
Brindisi plant handles an average value of 0.4 million tons per year (Assoporti 2014).  
The explosions of silos, which can have very severe effects and consequences, have 
occurred from time to time, as shown by statistical surveys (Abbasi and Abbasi, 
2007) (Demontis and Cremante., 2012). Despite the fact that the last decades have 
shown a decreasing trend, these accidents still occur in food plants with certain 
frequency. Particularly, some surveys have related the frequency to the tons handling 
of plants (Table 5). In the case of Brindisi, the average frequency is about 1 x 10-3 
year-1 or 1 x 10-6 (operative hours)-1. 
Table 5 Expected frequencies of grain explosions (Source: Demontis et al., 2012) 
Million tons per year Expected frequencies 
0,05 
1 x 10-7 (operative hours)-1 
1 x 10-4 years-1 
0,25 – 1,25 
1 x 10-6 (operative hours) -1 
1 x 10-3 years-1 
1,5 
1 x 10-5 (operative hours) -1 
1 x 10-2 years-1 
The prediction and modelling of the effects and consequences of dust/powder 
explosions is very complex. Nevertheless, basing on statistical data or historical 
surveys, it is possible to estimate some of the most dangerous effects on the context 
in which the accident occurs. Regarding the effect of dust explosions of silos or 
plants, some accidents occurred in the past can be assessed. One of these, 
particularly, is the explosion of a grain storage facility of the “Societé d’Exploitation 
Maritime Blayaise” (SEMABLA) occurred at Blaye in 1997 (Masson and 
Lechaudel, 1998). The accident occurred in a vertical silo, 33 m high. The whole 
capacity was about 130,000 tons, 40,000 of them in vertical silos and the other in the 
ground. After the explosion, 16 of 44 cells were largely in place, while the others 
were destroyed. The effects of the explosion involved a large area surrounding the 
silo: fragments and projectiles were found at a distance of 500 m from the source, 
producing damages to dwellings (the closest ones were 230 m far), especially broken 
windows. 
Thus, it points out that for a target located at a distance between 200-500 meters, 
damages could be produced by the projectiles and fragments ejected by the 
explosions.  
5.3 Consequences and effects on architectural heritage 
The assessment of potential accidents in the ports of Brindisi has led to the 
identification of the heritage elements with the highest risk. Especially, the castle 
and the fortress of Alfonso of Aragon (1481), the wooden shed of Montecatini 
Society (1930), the Maritime Station (1940) are the architectures with the highest 
potential risk, because of their closeness to the energy pole of Costa Morena and the 
grain silos.  
Firstly, the calculation of the accident consequences in terms of blast wave has been 
carried out for the castle. According to the results of the TNT equivalency, the impact 
of a vapor cloud explosion from an LPG carrier in the port originates a dangerous 
area for buildings with a diameter of 400 meters, as shown in Figure 7. Over this 
distance, a building will be affected by a blast wave able to originate some damages 
(Casal, 2008). Between the second and third target distance (200 – 400 m), minor 
structural damage could occur. In the case of stone-masonry buildings, such as the 
fortress, cracks could be generated due to the blast wave. These consequences 
depend on the building material and structural characteristics, including their state 
of preservation. The castle, as shown in Table 1, is in poor state of conservation and, 
then, is a somewhat vulnerable element.  
The risk of a powder explosion in the silos, located in the East Bay of the Inner Port, 
may affect several buildings, some of them with an historical value. The Montecatini 
shed and the Maritime Station are between 200 and 500 meters far from the potential 
explosion source (Fig. 8). Furthermore, they are not in good state of conservation, 
because they are not used, nowadays. As previously described, the survey of past 
accidents points out that at this distance damages may be generated, in terms of 
breakage on glasses and walls, with potential cultural and historical losses. 
Projectiles and missiles could reach also residential buildings that are in the 
surroundings, representing therefore a risk for people. 
Fig. 7 Dangerous area for scenario no.1  
 
 
 
 
 
   Fig. 8 Dangerous area for scenario no.2  
 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
The assessment of exceptional impacts on landscaping elements and historical 
heritage in port context has been carried out, focusing on the specific case of the port 
of Brindisi, in order to identify the heritage at risk. 
Firstly, it points out that the Brindisi has all the main characteristics of a modern 
port: passengers, cruises, cargoes and energy docks, located in different basins with 
a high level of interference with urban, historical and natural landscape.  
Secondly, the assessment of port activities has revealed that there are some potential 
accident scenarios with effects on landscaping components. Two main scenarios 
have been identified and assessed: an explosion of an LPG release after ships impact 
near the Costa Morena docks, and a dust explosion in the silos located in the East 
bay of the inner port. Particularly, the frequencies and the potential consequent 
damage on heritage have been estimated for the identified scenarios. 
The results show that one of the dangerous areas in the port is the East bay of the 
inner basin for the Montecatini shed, the Maritime Station and some residential 
buildings in the historic center of the city: a potential explosion could lead to material 
damages of these architectures, due to the fragments ejection. 
The other important element of the port landscape at risk is the Alfonsino castle, 
which is close to the dock where LPG and coal are handled. Particularly, considering 
a ship-ship impact near the canal of Costa Morena, a vapor cloud explosion may be 
originated in certain conditions. The effects on the castle could be severe, in terms 
of overpressure and fragments. Due to the poor state of preservation of the fortress, 
cracks could be produced on the stone-masonry structures, with a potential risk of 
loss of cultural and artistic features. 
The analysis performed has shown that, although the frequencies of these accidental 
impacts are very low, they should be taken into account in the management and 
planning of ports, as they could have effects on landscape more serious and 
disruptive than stationary impacts.  
This contribution is part of a wide research on architectural heritage of historical 
ports at risk in the Mediterranean Sea. The main goal will be the definition of a 
methodology for risk assessment in order to identify guidelines for preservation and 
enhancement of heritage of the sensible and critical context of modern ports. Future 
work will deal with the development of a Risk Charter for Historical Ports of Apulia 
(Italy), in which they will be considered both stationary and exceptional impacts of 
port activities, on one hand, and vulnerability of heritage, on the other one.  
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